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20150513_113350

Professor Mekonen Haddis giving a lecture on Ethiopian Foreign and National Security Strategy to students from Dila University.

Extremely excited that this third FFD Conference will be held in Addis. We are expecting about six to seven thousand participants. We are certain of a globally useful outcome of the conference. Just delighted to be part of this huge undertaking by Ethiopia.

Professor Mekonen Haddis

Financing for Development second draft expands, somewhat, on local finance

Following on a month and a half of negotiation and additional consultation, talks to create a global framework on how to pay for new anti-poverty and climate-related development efforts have resulted in a newly revised negotiating text.
Talks for what’s known as the Financing for Development (FFD) process aim for the first time to come up with a collective approach to paying for the new sustainable development agenda being agreed to later this year. The previous global development approach — the Millennium Development Goals — did not include agreement on how to finance the various massive interventions required, in education, sanitation, energy and the like.
Ahead of the MDGs’ replacement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the international community is now trying to rectify this problem. While the SDGs are to be finalized in September, the Financing for Development process is trying to come to agreement at a major summit in mid-July, in Addis Ababa. The new approaches will also facilitate implementation of a climate-related accord expected in December as well as the New Urban Agenda to be finalized at next year’s Habitat III conference on cities.
From all reports, however, the Financing for Development negotiations remain highly contentious, and thus this newly revised negotiating draft will be keenly scrutinized. (The first FFD draft came out in mid-March; the revision was released during the first week of May. A summary of civil society input can also be found here.)
A key issue of debate is the extent to which local government authorities — in cities, municipalities and others — will have powers and freedom to determine how and where new development funding associated with the SDGs will be spent. This is a controversial prospect, however, particularly given that it is the central governments of member states that are doing the negotiating. As noted in previous Citiscope reporting, advocates have expressed frustration at the very minor mention that cities and sub-national governments received in the draft text.
In the revised text, for the most part, this hasn’t changed all that much. Cities and local authorities do receive a smattering of references, some new. But a key overview strengthened this contextualization only slightly.
“The fundamental responsibility for organizing this global partnership lies with governments,” the revised text notes. “But our success will also depend on the resources, knowledge and ingenuity of business, civil society, the scientific community, academia, philanthropists and foundations, parliaments, local authorities, volunteers and other stakeholders.”
Much of the concern around local authorities is focused on infrastructure. Some USD 1 trillion a year is forecast to be needed over the next decade and a half to pay for the roads, electricity lines, floodwater embankments and other needs seen as central to current development aims. And in many cases, no one knows better than local authorities where and how this money could be best spent.
In the second draft of the Financing for Development text, a key section (Paragraph 31) on these issues does indeed include some substantive revisions. The text of that section is reproduced here in full, with deletions in square brackets and additions in bold:
We further acknowledge that in [more and more] many countries, responsibilities for revenues, expenditures and investments in sustainable development are being devolved to the sub-national level and municipalities, which often lack adequate technical capacity, financing and support. We therefore commit to develop mechanisms to assist them, including to strengthen capacity, particularly in areas of infrastructure [project] development, local taxation, sectorial finance and debt issuance and management, including access to domestic bond markets. We will strive to support [our] local governments in their efforts to mobilize revenues and strengthen links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas within the context of national sustainable development strategies. We commit to scale up international cooperation to strengthen capacity, particularly in climate friendly policies and infrastructure investments. We will support cities and local authorities, particularly in LDCs, in implementing resilient infrastructure, including energy, transport, water and sanitation and buildings. We will also support them to implement climate-friendly policies [. and investments. Reliable support for national and local capacity for prevention and mitigation of external shocks and risk management is needed. We must also] In these efforts, we will ensure appropriate local community participation in decisions affecting their communities, based on country circumstances. We will develop and implement holistic disaster risk management at all levels in line with the Sendai Framework. In this regard, reliable support for national and local capacity for prevention, adaptation and mitigation of external shocks and risk management is needed.
The Sendai Framework, reference to which is included in the new revisions, is new global guidelines on disaster-risk mitigation, agreed upon at a major summit in March.
The changes in the local-financing section are extensive but still largely tweaks. Nonetheless, such revisions indicate clearly the contours of the debates that have been taking place behind the scenes and which will likely continue through the July conference in Addis.
Elsewhere, however, one of the most notable insertions to the new Financing for Development draft likewise deals with this looming infrastructure-financing need. The member states are now making a new call for an “infrastructure platform”, to facilitate multiple aspects of the process of getting necessary infrastructure built in developing countries.
“We note with concern the large gap in financing for resilient and quality infrastructure, in particular in developing countries,” Paragraph 46 reads. “Given the importance of this challenge, particularly for developing countries, more needs to be done, and we call for a new infrastructure platform to bring together all stakeholders to make to ensure that no countries or sectors are left behind, and that investment is aligned with sustainable development.”
The section continues:
To address constraints, we will imbed resilient infrastructure investment plans in our national sustainable development strategies, and strengthen the domestic enabling environment. We commit to ensuring the technical support for countries to translate these plans into concrete project pipelines, as well as for individual implementable projects, particularly with regard to the preparation of feasibility studies, negotiation of complex contracts, and the management of projects. Efforts should aim to develop local skills and capacity.
– See more at: http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/news/2015/05/financing-development-second-draft-expands-somewhat-local-finance#sthash.URn1Qd3V.dpuf

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Professor Mekonen Haddis giving a speech at the German Alumni Conference dinner at the Hilton Addis.

The 4th Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa was held in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia on 18-19 April, 2015. The agenda for this year’s discussion was “secularism and Political Faith”. Hoping that you will have a glance of this wonderful Forum, I have included the outcome document.

Professor Mekonen Haddis

TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA
4th Tana Forum on ‘’ Secularism and Politised faith’’
Outcomes document
Introduction
The 4th Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa convened in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, on 18-19 April, 2015, on the theme “Secularism and Politicised Faith.” The Forum brought together Heads of States and Governments as well as high-level decision makers on peace and security; drawn from government, continental and regional institutions, the diplomatic community, private sector, civil society, academia, and other stakeholders. In total, two hundred and twenty (220) participants drawn from different parts of Africa and abroad participated in the Forum.
The Tana Forum has become a unique and veritable platform for keen debate among participants on current peace and security trends as well as concerns in Africa. The theme for this year was particularly instructive in view of how the proliferation of faith-inspired groups and movements are impacting, in profound ways, on the security landscape across the continent.
The deliberations over the two days produced the following key issues and recommendations.
Key Emerging Issues
1. Africa has shown dramatic progress in economic development, political stability and improved governance. 1
TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA
However, there are growing concerns that the stability of the continent is capable of being undermined by the activities of groups driven solely by exclusionary religious agendas and strategies;
2. Africa is a highly diverse continent; but the continent’s sheer diversity could be a source of immense opportunities but also of profoundly disturbing threats. There is therefore an urgent imperative to develop appropriate leadership capacities and governance infrastructures that serve the best interests of the states and their citizens;
3. There is a great need to articulate and develop an agenda of secularism underscored by the tolerance of different shades of opinions and religious tenets; where citizens are not threatened but rather feel a sense of belonging. It is the responsibility of governments, but also that of citizens, to promote peaceful co-existence among religions;
4. There is a real and immediate danger in the manner that external forces are reaching out to and becoming involved in the activities of faith-branded political groups. The need for preventive and precautionary measures to checkmate such external influences cannot be over-emphasised;
5. While it is the aspiration of governments and their citizens to enthrone stable and progressive social development, this must be done in the context of an acceptance of the principles of good governance; where fundamental human rights are protected, equity and rule of law prevails; 2
TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA
6. Governments should lead by example in combating corruption at all levels, especially within government and in business sector, and to use the wealth of nations to alleviate poverty, unemployment and hardships which undermines development, peace and security;
7. Special efforts are to be made to address the basic needs of women, youths and other marginalized groups of society in terms of education, job opportunities and participation in societal affairs. Real and practical efforts have to be made to mainstream such groups into decision-making processes, including those relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as peace-building efforts;
8. There is need for governments to work with other stakeholders and key national institutions to stem radical religious tendencies capable of undermining civil liberties and citizens’ security; and, as well, to focus on tackling their structural (or root) factors rather than dwelling on the symptoms;
9. The intellectual community have a pivotal role to play in the re-composition of public consciousness; including the construction of new social narratives that inculcates the spirit of citizenship amongst young people and provide them with sustainable avenues for constructive social engagement; and
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TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA
10. The AU, along with regional economic communities, have a major role to play in providing strategic guidance to member states
Recommendations
1) It is stressed that there is need for early identification of religious beliefs, tenets and practices capable of putting state and citizen’s security at risk through innovative and robust policy frameworks and early warning systems;
2) It is recognized that diversity in Africa is an important characteristic of society and that governments need to recognise and facilitate dialogue that takes into account such diversity and to build on them for social harmony;
3) It is urged that states instil the spirit of tolerance through policies, capacity-building and facilitation of open dialogues between different groups regardless of their religious or political affiliations;
4) It is noted with urgency the need for African states, civil society institutions and faith-based organisations to be vigilant about the role and activities of radicalised movements that ultimately endangers the lives of all citizens;
Efforts being made by states, organisations and private individuals, are acknowledged but such must ultimately ensure that marginalised groups are mainstreamed at every 4
TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA
state in public policy planning, planning, implementation and monitoring initiatives. In this aspect, there is an urgent imperative for the full emancipation of women across the continent;
5) It is requested that states and responsible institutions show greater commitment to tackle corruption;
6) Achievements in various social and economic sectors across Africa are noted, but, we urge governments to demonstrate greater commitment towards monitoring and implementing values of human rights, inclusion, equity and rule of law;
7) It is noted with deep concern that the insecurity that continues to affect the continent through criminal and heinous attacks by groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab against civilian populations; including those against women and children in the name of religion, continues unabated. African states are urged to be more proactive, consistent and alert in securing and ensuring the security of all its citizens from such groups;
8) It is hoped that the enhancement of security should not be at the expense of democratic freedoms or Pan-African solidarity. Rather than evolve secure states that stifle initiatives or place border restrictions that limits interaction and mobility, more openness within and between African states should be encouraged or promoted. The collective energies of the African peoples should be mobilised to enhance security for all. ‘The people are not the enemy’;
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TANA HIGH-LEVEL FORUM ON SECURITY IN AFRICA
9) Current efforts being undertaken by the AU to ensure peace and security on the continent is recognized and appreciated. Such must go further to also work with states to ensure adequate attention is put towards prevention and early warning systems. It is further urged that the AU work with states and other stakeholders to incorporate civic education at all levels of education with the goal of inculcating and building civic consciousness and promoting unity between and among citizens; including but not limited to formal education.
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Congratulations to my dear friend Professor Elizabeth Bradley who was appointed as director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University. A well deserved appointment.

Professor Mekonen Haddis

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Looking out of my office window, raining hard. A conducive atmosphere to analyze.

Professor Mekonen Haddis

An excellent article. I believe option number one is the best option. The two “leaders” are part of the problem not the solution.I also believe that the scenario is only dependent on the will of IGAD, US, EU, etc. to be able to use the stick on these two not the warring parties.

Professor Mekonen Haddis

March 2015
No End in Sight
Africa Digest
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) would perform an important service to the people of South Sudan if it succeeds in ending the current civil war, revitalises the role of its collective leadership and decision-making, and transforms itself into a popular, democratic movement that appeals to its political rivals and the general population with the simple message of unity and equality, insist Abel Abate Demissie and Dr Mehari Taddele Maru
It has been a year and few months since the South Sudan conflict erupted and led to the killings of tens of thousands of civilians and the displacement of over two million people, more than 10 percent of the population, according to the United Nations estimate. There have been many peace and power sharing agreements signed between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Dr Riek Machar, but to no avail. On March 6, 2015, on the completion of the deadline for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led mediation, the IGAD Chair, Prime Minister Haile Mariam of Ethiopia expressed his disappointment on the failure of the two warring parties to come up with a breakthrough in the mediation. With an intention of putting pressure on the warring parties while in a closed-door ‘final’ negotiation in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa on March 3, the United Nations Security Council members unanimously adopted a resolution to impose sanctions on those disrupting efforts to restore peace in South Sudan. With the endorsement of IGAD countries, both Russia and China supported the sanction.

Challenges Affecting the Mediation Effort

International actors supporting the South Sudanese peace effort, including the IGAD as well as the ‘Troika’ (comprising the US, UK and Norway), have reiterated warnings to impose severe sanctions on those dragging their feet in the peace process. The US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power was quoted by Reuters as saying,“(IGAD) are now sitting down with the parties and making (it) very clear that if this round of talks … do not succeed then IGAD and the (Security) Council are going to need to move out on these long-threatened sanctions.” This is the continuation of US Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort in June 2014 to persuade three of South Sudan’s immediate neighbours to impose tough penalties against the spoilers of the mediation process.

The Information and Broadcasting Minister Michael Makuei Lueth has reportedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the IGAD-mediation team. “We are appealing to the region and especially the Kenyan government. Kenya is the centre for everything here in the region. This is where our message should be carried from,” he is reported to have said. In August 2014, Ezekiel LolGatkuoth, former South Sudanese ambassador to the United States and top aide of Dr Riek Machar, criticised the IGAD for ‘legitimising Kiir’. In June 2014, the South Sudanese government threatened to withdraw from the IGAD mediation after the Executive Secretary of the IGAD, (Eng.) Mahboub Maalim, allegedly said that the warring parties were ‘stupid’ if they believed they could win militarily.

The only reason that has kept the warring factions in the negotiation process seems to be the fear of alienation and sanction across the region and the world. South Sudan, which receives a major part of its budget from international donors, is not expected to survive long without it. Lacking the type of party and state structure and popular anti-western social base that enabled the Sudanese and Eritrean regime to survive and sustain themselves under similar sanctions and international pressure, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the state would be unable to sustain similar levels of sanctions, if imposed. The state, which depends solely on oil revenue for financing the entire public service, faces a serious decline in its ability to exercise legitimate core functions, including the maintenance of law and order, and the operation of the armed forces (SPLA). This weakness constitutes a recipe for state failure in South Sudan.

On the other hand, if the anticipated sanctions that include asset freezes are imposed, the damage on the rebel’s side will also be fatal. As most of the finance is received from the Nuer diaspora and some other sympathisers abroad, there is no way the Machar group can afford a cut in its budget.

There is also a growing consensus that the mediation efforts should employ a fresh approach as present efforts have not delivered the anticipated result. The mediation has taken place in unfavourable circumstances with the requirement to adopt some imperfect positions and approaches, such as the inclusion of ethnic and religious representatives with the vision and commitment to transform themselves and their followers from a purely sectarian outlook to that of democratic citizenry. In this regard, a serious concern of the IGAD-led mediation process is the need to ensure the inclusivity of representatives of all communities, particularly those from peripheral areas located far away from the capital Juba. These include organisations that were disenfranchised even before the crisis erupted (mainly in the diaspora) and those who were displaced during and after the crisis.

Possible Way Out

The international community needs to continue exerting its utmost pressure on the warring parties. The pressure should also be imposed on regional countries that are directly involved in support of one group over the other. The unilateral involvement of certain countries to support one group over the other will drive South Sudan in particular and the region in general into a deeper political quagmire. The best way to resolve the South Sudan crisis is to form a transitional caretaker government, composed of individuals considered independent, but with popular legitimacy and professional integrity, to lead the country for a specified time period. The transitional government would be entrusted with the role of formulating a constitution and forming an electoral board. It also needs to envision a federalist state as the conflict is mainly along ethnic lines. This would ultimately require the exclusion of the two leaders of the warring factions from any state leadership position. Ensuring a transitional process that is insulated from undue influence of the warring groups like an independent transitional arrangement would create a level playing political field for all participants, including those outside the SPLM/A.

Given that legitimacy is now dispersed among many actors, including the incumbent, the rebel faction, the third bloc and other civil society organisations, mainly religious organs, this legitimate transitional process could unite all South Sudanese political actors. For the transitional process to enjoy popular legitimacy, it must be inclusive. The caretaker government must bring representatives of Internally Displaced People (IDP) and refugees as well as the diaspora together to participate in a constitutive national dialogue. Such an arrangement would ensure that stability and legitimacy can be pursued together, without sacrificing legitimacy for the sake of stability by allowing the powers that be to remain in power. This arrangement would ensure the comprehensive nature and sustainability of the peace agreement.

However, despite being most desirable, this scenario still remains the least probable, as it is mainly dependent on the political will of the warring parties, particularly their leaders. For the incumbent group and perhaps for the current president and the former vice president, personally, inclusivity may not lead to a happy ending. Companies and external forces may work against such an arrangement, as it may endanger existing financial and other interests.

Multiple Scenarios

A more pragmatic solution would be to work for a government of national unity. South Sudan can usher in a transitional Government of National Unity similar to that of Kenya and Zimbabwe where the ruling and opposition parties share power. As a result, these countries entered into relatively peaceful election processes.

A similar situation might occur in South Sudan. However, there is no strong judiciary in the country, as in Kenya, and to a limited extent in Zimbabwe. More essentially, the SPLA is not a professionally neutral and with a united army as in the case of the Kenyan armed forces. Despite many concerns surrounding the result of Kenya’s last election, the Kenyan armed forces remained neutral. The SPLA still remains an ideologically and ethnically politicised rebel army. Governments of national unity do not necessarily lead to democratic dispensations, but as experienced in Kenya and Zimbabwe, they are capable of delivering stability and reducing political violence.

A government of national unity composed of the warring groups of the SPLM is highly probable, given that a stable central government is vital in order to prevent further violence and total collapse of the South Sudanese state. While seeking the best scenario under a caretaker government, a government of national unity may simply be the best outcome that the IGAD-led mediation effort can deliver.

However, the continuation of the current situation where the incumbent SPLM group in government continues to stay in power is unacceptable. With such dispersed centres of legitimacy, the status quo is unsustainable unless the SPLM/A is reconstituted afresh. The root cause of the current crisis resides in the unwillingness of the SPLM/A to transform itself into a democratic political party fit to govern post-independent South Sudan. Thus, stability and democracy in South Sudan requires radical reform of the SPLM/A, or total replacement of the current system of governance by a constitutional democracy. The current government will be able to achieve popular legitimacy only if it embarks upon the democratic reconstruction of the governing structures of the SPLM/A and commences an inclusive, constitutive national dialogue process. The SPLM would perform an important service to the people of South Sudan if it succeeds in closing this chapter, revitalises the role of its collective leadership and decision-making and transforms itself into a popular, democratic movement that appeals to its political rivals and the general population with the simple message of unity and equality.
Author

A specialist in human rights and humanitarian law, Dr Mehari Taddele Maru is an international consultant on African Union affairs, and an expert in Public Administration, Policy and Management. He is Adjunct Assistant Professor at Centre for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University, and lectures at NATO Defense College (Italy), UN Institute for Economic Development and Planning (Senegal), the National Defense University (USA), and African Center for Strategic Studies (USA).

Abel Abate Demissie is presently serving as Senior Researcher at the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD).The writers may be reached at abel.eiipd@gmail.com

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